Among all the ruinous consequences of the so-called U.S. Department of Government Efficiency’s efforts to cut bureaucracy, none has been as profound as the destruction of the United States’ ability to deliver foreign aid. A comprehensive Lancet study shows that the U.S. Agency for International Development’s assistance prevented more than 90 million deaths between 2001 and 2021. Using a mortality model, Boston University epidemiologist Brooke Nichols has estimated that the 2025 dismantling of USAID contributed to more than 700,000 excess deaths over roughly a year. A study published in Science this May found that after USAID’s shutdown, places that had lost large amounts of the agency’s assistance experienced a marked uptick in armed clashes and riots. The development economists Marcella Nicolini and Fabio Sabatini, meanwhile, showed that economic activity in areas that formerly enjoyed substantial U.S. aid had dramatically declined.
No country can be a great power without a functioning foreign aid program. But today, the United States does not have one. After 90 percent of USAID’s programs were terminated and 90 percent of its staff members were laid off, Congress formally reappropriated most of the budgetary funding dedicated to U.S. foreign aid. But the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not released all of this appropriated funding. More damaging still, USAID’s mechanisms for spending aid money have been dismantled. According to the Pew Research Center, annual U.S. foreign aid disbursements fell by $26 billion between the 2023–24 and 2024–25 fiscal years; $2.5 billion in appropriated funding designated for foreign aid went unspent by the end of the 2025–26 fiscal year.
Russell Vought, OMB’s director and a self-identified Christian nationalist, has stonewalled spending for programs related to supporting democracy and insisted that humanitarian grants can be sent only to two specific Christian nongovernmental organizations. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, meanwhile, announced that he wanted to end funding to USAID development contractors, universities, and local civil society organizations without understanding the downside of other options for aid dollars, such as budget support, which are far less accountable, uniquely American, and results-oriented.
Given the suffering created by the end of USAID, it is even more troubling that DOGE’s objectives to slash waste and boost transparency have not been realized. U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2025 "big beautiful bill" erased any modest savings won by DOGE’s cuts to foreign aid. And the decision to move USAID’s functions to the State Department, which has weak business systems and inadequate staff to manage aid programs, has thus far led to the transfer of $3.8 billion in U.S. foreign aid money to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and $15.9 billion directly into foreign governments’ treasuries through memorandums of understanding.
These governments often have limited capacity to spend the money wisely and produce results. In the past, USAID’s Office of the Inspector General has harshly criticized such options because it is nearly impossible to audit the transfers. Over 90 percent of the countries involved in these agreements score below 50 (out of 100) on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating serious systemic corruption. This may explain why State Department political appointees have kept the texts of these health agreements secret.
Clashing demands—that aid should relieve misery abroad, that it ought to serve U.S. military and diplomatic interests, and that it ought to yield rapid, visible, and quantifiable results—always complicated the enterprise. And over the course of 65 years since USAID’s 1961 founding, overregulation, a centralization of control over programs, and congressional meddling created a rigid straitjacket that made the United States less responsive to local governments and local needs. But what the current U.S. administration didn’t understand was that USAID’s bureaucracy, so often presented as an obstacle to effectiveness, was in fact an adaptation to manage these conflicts.
Simply abolishing that institutional architecture with no plan to replace it has only generated more confusion and waste. Meanwhile, China is racing to offer alternative sources of development financing, and Russia is seeking to expand its global influence through security partnerships. The United States cannot afford to let its foreign aid apparatus atrophy. It must redirect it, not reject aid.
Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Ever since USAID was created, the expectations that leaders in Washington had for foreign aid have conflicted with realities in the developing world, the way actual aid programs are managed, and the speed and nature of societal change. When I read through USAID’s 1960s-era archives to write my new book, I was struck that the demands early U.S. policymakers made of the institution were the same as those made today: policymakers wanted rapid, visible, and quantifiable results. Those demands were as unrealistic then as they are now. U.S. President John F. Kennedy hoped that poverty in Latin America would visibly recede within a couple of years of USAID’s creation, as he was understandably worried that the Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro’s Marxist ideology was spreading across the region. Fourteen months after the organization’s inception, an article by Joseph Kraft in Harper’s Magazine reported that policymakers in Washington had already judged it a failure because it was not delivering "quick and visible results." David Bell, USAID’s second administrator, recalled in 1965 that Kennedy had complained that the agency was "slow-moving, inefficient, and unresponsive to the President’s policy."
But diplomacy and development operate on profoundly different time horizons. Nearly all foreign aid programs have diplomatic consequences, even if they aren’t designed to. When diplomatic goals become the main or only goals of an aid program, however—for instance, when U.S. aid kept the Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in power during the Cold War—good development often fails.
The United States began institutionalizing foreign aid after World War II through agencies and programs such as the Marshall Plan, which supported the postwar economic recovery of Western Europe, and the Point Four Program, a Truman administration initiative to promote development in poor countries to reduce their susceptibility to communism. All along, policymakers debated whether U.S. assistance programs should principally aim to save lives and reduce extreme poverty or to support U.S. foreign policy by countering the influence of hostile powers.
In fact, USAID ended up playing a key role in winning the Cold War. American assistance strengthened governments targeted for Soviet and Chinese communist subversion, particularly in Asia. After U.S. President Richard Nixon entered his second year in office, aid spending for agriculture was increased to 50 percent of USAID’s budget and was directed primarily toward Asia. According to multiple studies by development economists, the effort saved more than 245 million lives. The green revolution, implemented over decades in Pakistan, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan (among other countries), helped produce large grain surpluses that fueled industrialization and economic growth and averted the kind of famines that historically produce coups or mass uprisings.
Throughout this era, however, Washington’s demands that aid accomplish diplomatic goals—and quickly and visibly—also undermined the most important elements of development programs: institution building and policy reform. Strong institutions separate wealthy countries from poor ones. The former have them in abundance, while the latter do not. Institution building and policy reform should be the focus of aid programs. But institution building and policy reform is difficult to measure, takes many years to implement successfully, and is not immediately visible. Instead, policymakers insisted that USAID do service delivery, producing valuable humanitarian programs that were ultimately unsustainable.
Buried in Paperwork
Most critical analyses of U.S. foreign aid conclude that USAID came to focus on process over substance, resulting in excessive bureaucracy. What these critiques overlook is what caused this obsessive focus on process. A web of federal regulatory and oversight agencies (what scholars call the counterbureaucracy) loosed on U.S. aid programs an army of federal auditors, accountants, regulators, compliance officers, and congressional staffers dedicated to reining in the bureaucracy and—supposedly—protecting taxpayers’ money. This onslaught slowed down USAID’s implementation of programs and created massive amounts of paperwork. It did not make aid programs more effective.
Historically, Congress ended up playing a particularly intrusive role in the management of U.S. foreign aid programs. USAID reported to 14 congressional committees, which often clashed, pulling USAID in different directions and slowing program implementation. For example, the House and Senate agriculture committees, under the influence of the agriculture lobby, stonewalled efforts to reform food aid by insisting it be exported from the United States, while legislative appropriators and authorizers from foreign affairs committees strongly supported local purchase reform. Congress also imposed intrusive earmarks—defined amounts allocated for specific programs, projects, or organizations. When countries asked for specific help, USAID often could not respond, because the glut of earmarks meant there was no discretionary money left.
Starting in the 1990s, the State Department attempted to exert more control over the USAID budget. A 1998 statute, for instance, made the USAID administrator report directly to the secretary of state. In January 2001, the State Department took control of USAID’s budget. That only led lawmakers—who often distrusted State—to add more earmarks. To protect U.S. foreign aid programs from an especially hostile Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Republican Senator Jesse Helms, the Clinton administration instructed each cabinet-level department to create its own aid programs that would fall outside that committee’s jurisdiction. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at the Department of Health and Human Services established regional offices around the world, the Environmental Protection Agency developed solar energy projects in poor countries, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency signed agreements with more than 28 developing countries to assist in disaster management. USAID was already running programs such as these, yielding overlapping mandates which added to the incoherence of U.S. foreign aid.
When I became USAID administrator in 2001, I discovered a foreign aid program whose funds were straitjacketed by nearly 250 congressional earmarks, a sum exceeding USAID’s total appropriation. At the time, Ethiopia was one of the most severely food insecure countries in the world. Yet in 2007 only 1.5 percent of USAID’s budget was devoted to agricultural development, 1.5 percent to economic growth, and 1.5 percent to governance reform; Congressional earmarks made it impossible to fund these programs to match the Ethiopian government’s request.
The Wrong Fix
Despite all these impediments, foreign aid remained a critical component of U.S. foreign policy. The Department of Defense had a particularly productive partnership with USAID, recognizing that foreign aid could be as important as force in incentivizing insurgents to make peace. The effects of USAID projects in Afghanistan were profound but took shape over long time horizons neither the State Department nor the Defense Department had any patience for. USAID’s Afghanistan media-development program, for instance, was a great success, as documented in a Harvard Kennedy School study by The New York Times’s David Rohde. Major academic studies have shown that in Iraq, community development projects undertaken by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) employed large numbers of young men who might otherwise have been recruited into militias, reducing U.S. military casualties in the provinces with the highest levels of violence. In 2004, Army General Peter Chiarelli called the USAID officer managing the program, Kirk Day, a "hero" for saving his soldiers’ lives.
The DOGE team abolished OTI last year, along with innumerable other programs that alleviated suffering globally and enhanced U.S. soft power. When Congress restored many cuts to foreign aid, it did not reinstate USAID’s veteran staff, historical archives, business systems, field presence, or implementing partner networks of universities, international nongovernmental organizations, local civil society groups, and international development contractors. The transfer of programs to the Department of State only exacerbated the contradictions that have long bedeviled U.S. foreign aid. Few secretaries of state (or secretaries of defense) have any development background, experience, or technical knowledge, and paradoxically, when aid is seen simply as a tool of diplomacy or defense rather than an end in itself, the diplomatic good it can do is compromised.
Dismantling USAID did not abolish the need for technically knowledgeable staff and bureaucratic systems. In May 2025, the State Department inspector general issued an intimidating report detailing what the department will have to do to competently manage foreign aid programs, a list of demands it will have difficulty meeting. And in September this year, the Government Accountability Office issued a highly critical audit of the State Department’s inadequate management of foreign aid programs, finding that the department lacked documented standards for deciding which aid programs to terminate, could not produce data on its own staffing, and maintained incomplete or incorrect records on grants and agreements. This result was unsurprising, given that the State Department is a diplomatic policy institution, not a program management agency. Merging USAID into the State Department makes as much sense as merging Microsoft with ExxonMobil, given the disparate time horizons on which the two institutions operate and their differences in mission statements and business systems.
The State Department has pursued alternative arrangements for distributing aid that require less direct management. For example, it has negotiated 36 memorandums of understanding with governments in developing countries to transfer U.S. aid funds to their health ministries, so they can spend the program money themselves. But in return for these transfers, Washington has asked these countries to send private health-care data to the U.S. government, accept undocumented immigrants the U.S. government deports, and, in some cases, give U.S. mining companies access to their rare-earth minerals. Because health programs save lives, they should be distributed based on need, not on parochial, transactional American demands.
Many countries have understandably resisted this kind of bargain. USAID had technical staff that could assess a foreign government’s ability to manage funds responsibly. In practice, it ran a detailed and thorough vetting of nearly every aspect of the governments it partnered with. The State Department, by contrast, only vets according to the legal minimum and treats foreign governments as it treats international or U.S.-based NGOs. State’s approach will increase the risk that funds are stolen by local government ministries that lack the control systems needed to ensure accountability.
Cut the Red Tape
The very public and grossly inaccurate attacks on USAID’s integrity and management by Trump and DOGE’s erstwhile leader, Elon Musk, have damaged the agency’s reputation so extensively that simply resurrecting it will be difficult. But Washington’s aid apparatus also needs more coherent organization than it was afforded in the past. In his celebrated work Bureaucracy, on which my book is structured, the political scientist James Q. Wilson argues that strong U.S. departments or agencies need "relative autonomy": clearly defined missions they do not substantially share with other agencies. By this logic, if the United States wants a high-functioning, coherent foreign aid program, it must first consolidate all aid functions within one department.
Abolishing field offices (called USAID missions) also made administering aid programs much more difficult, blunted true accountability and U.S. influence in the developing world, and reduced the visibility of U.S. aid programs. These country missions must be reestablished, reporting to the local U.S. ambassador. In Washington, Congress should create a new cabinet-level department reporting to the president that manages all the government’s aid programs, which would make it possible to trim staff, streamline program implementation, and avoid policy incoherence. At least 80 percent of this new department’s staff should be deployed abroad, not in Washington. The United States will always need to be able to launch aid programs with an expressly diplomatic purpose and short time horizon, and the State Department should determine these projects and their spending levels. But it should leave the programs’ management up to the new aid department—as it did during the Cold War, when USAID was independent of State.
This new department should also report to fewer congressional committees—a foreign affairs authorizing committee and an appropriations subcommittee in each legislative body. The practice of burdening the United States’ foreign aid budget with domestically appealing earmarks—which prevents aid from responding to foreign countries’ own needs—must be reduced.
In the past, the overregulation and bureaucratization of foreign aid driven by the demands of the counterbureaucracy prioritized process over programs and compliance over developmental outcomes. The new aid department must be given regulatory relief. One way to do that is for Congress to set up charter missions, similar to charter schools, as an experiment to see whether accountability deteriorates. These deregulated charter missions would be free from burdensome reporting requirements the counterbureaucracy demands. In recent years, the World Bank has tried a similar approach and found that it improved its programs’ effectiveness without increasing fraud.
The status quo for U.S. foreign aid cannot last. But Washington cannot revert to the old status quo, which generated the kind of dissatisfactions among policymakers that helped lead to its dismantling. Now is the time to bring more coherence to U.S. foreign aid programs with these reforms, if the new Democratic Congress and future administrations show a forward-looking vision.