When it comes to Iran, the Trump administration maintains a decidedly dismal record. Months of intense American and Israeli bombings have failed to wear down the Islamic Republic, and Washington has repeatedly found itself unable to bend Tehran’s will at the negotiating table. Yet despite seven months of persistent setbacks, U.S. officials believe they have finally turned a critical page. They have implemented a wave of fresh economic sanctions while maintaining the existing American blockade of the country’s southern coast, effectively throttling its access to outside commerce. As a result, Washington has concluded that the Islamic Republic will soon either concede or be utterly broken. "We are going to economically asphyxiate this regime," Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent declared on September 1.
There is no doubt that Washington and its allies have dealt significant physical and financial damage to Iran. But the Islamic Republic does not believe it is unraveling. In fact, Tehran is increasingly convinced that it will ultimately defeat the United States—and it is not hard to understand why. The Iranian government did not merely survive the heavy U.S.-Israeli bombardment; it retaliated ferociously, damaging American military bases and obstructing commercial traffic through the vital Strait of Hormuz. While its citizens are paying a hefty economic price due to wartime destruction and Washington’s financial cutoffs, a large portion of the population has rallied around the flag, accepting that hardship is necessary to defend the homeland.
Consequently, Tehran has grown increasingly emboldened. While its political and military officials may not always see eye to eye on every tactical maneuver, they share a unified strategic ambition: evicting U.S. forces entirely from the Persian Gulf, forcing Washington to lift all economic sanctions, and compelling the United States to formally accept Iran as a recognized great power.
This agenda might sound overly audacious given that Iran has been materially weakened by months of conflict. Yet the Islamic Republic firmly believes its aims are within reach. It calculates that its military can drive U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf by continuing to strike American bases directly and by encouraging Arab nations to pressure Washington into a withdrawal. Furthermore, Tehran calculates that by wreaking havoc on global energy markets, it can force the White House to lift its punishing economic restrictions. In short, Tehran’s theory of victory relies on holding out and inflicting enough pain that the United States eventually ends its containment policy altogether.
CLOSING RANKS
No one doubts that Iran has been battered by the war. Months of American and Israeli airstrikes have damaged the country’s industrial base and critical infrastructure, spiking unemployment and pushing a greater share of the population into poverty. Washington’s strict sanctions and naval blockade have simultaneously fueled rampant inflation. On a tactical level, the American and Israeli militaries can point to notable successes, most prominently the assassination of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Strategically, however, the broader conflict has produced results that run counter to Washington’s initial expectations. U.S. officials originally believed that punishing aerial bombardments and sweeping efforts to degrade the Iranian economy would bring the regime quickly to their knees. They did not. Washington also hoped that assassinating Khamenei would trigger a massive anti-government uprising across the country. That scheme failed as well. Instead, Khamenei’s death brought out the Islamic Republic’s most ardent supporters, who marched nightly in the nation’s major cities and were eventually joined by Iranians of various political persuasions rallying in defense of their homeland.
When the war first started, neighboring Turkey made logistical plans to accommodate an estimated 70,000 Iranian refugees. In the end, very few people fled. As the conflict progressed, many Iranians living abroad actually returned home, including long-exiled cultural figures, journalists, and musicians such as singers Mohsen Namjoo and Bijan Mortazavi.
This surge in nationalism should not be misconstrued as a glowing endorsement of the Islamic Republic. Many Iranians remain deeply unhappy with the country’s ruling clerical leadership. However, their anger toward their own government has been largely subsumed by a far more intense anger toward Washington. Previously, a majority of Iranians were skeptical of the state’s long-standing claims that the United States was bent on their country’s total destruction, with many hoping instead that Tehran would pursue better relations with Washington.
The bombing of Iranian cities and U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated threats to annihilate the country’s civilization—including statements suggesting he might "blow the entire nation up" and drive it "into hell with no chance of survival"—fundamentally shifted public opinion. Today, Iranians across the political spectrum believe that the United States wants to obliterate their nation, or at least force it into total capitulation to every American demand.
This conclusion was consistently apparent during lengthy conversations with Iranians of diverse ideologies, conducted from the time Washington first launched its bombing campaign in June 2025 through the present day. The vast majority of those interviewed expressed deep distress and anger at their government following the violent crackdowns that met the mass protests of January. Yet, as the war dragged on and Trump escalated his rhetorical threats, public sentiment shifted drastically.
"We believed so much in the American promise," said Ali, a 45-year-old long-time dissident who has spent years in prison for his political activism. "Yet with this war and everything that Trump and his administration have said and done, it’s obvious the Americans sold us a false bill of goods. They want nothing but Iran’s total submission, and that’s not acceptable to us."
Mahsa, a writer and artist in her 30s, echoed those sentiments. "Everything we believed the United States stood for—freedom, respect, and democracy—I now see as lies," she said. "As angry as I’ve been at our state over the years, this is our homeland, and no outside country has the right to kill our leaders, drop bombs on our children, and attempt to destroy us."
It is little wonder, then, that Khamenei’s July funeral procession drew millions of mourners despite active wartime conditions. At the gathering, participants handed out red flags symbolizing a desire for retribution. Shortly afterward, Iran attacked commercial vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz, shattering the precarious cease-fire the country had struck with the United States just three months prior.
Many U.S. officials maintain the belief that intense economic pressure will ultimately force a shift in public opinion—that if citizens suffer enough, they will overthrow their government, or that the regime, fearing for its own survival, will yield to American demands. Analysts note this is largely magical thinking. Iran has spent the past 15 years deliberately engineering an economy structured to withstand sustained American economic warfare. Iranian authorities have forged strong trade ties with neighbors and achieved near self-sufficiency in food production. As a result, despite high inflation and economic pain, cities and towns have experienced no critical shortages of essential goods and services.
"It’s incredible how well-run everything has been inside of the country," said Hamid Reza, an engineer who regularly travels between Isfahan and Tehran for work. "Things are expensive, but there have been no shortages whatsoever across the country. Everything has been managed internally with a lot of care."
That is not to say Iranians feel optimistic about their future. They remain deeply anxious and yearn for a return to calm and economic relief. Crucially, however, they do not view the U.S.-Israeli war as a campaign of liberation. Instead, they perceive it as gratuitous foreign aggression. The resulting wave of nationalism has blurred traditional political lines and significantly reduced the likelihood of an internal uprising, leaving the Islamic Republic politically strengthened.
PAIN AND GAIN
Much like the broader population, the Iranian government has adopted a sharply hostile view of Washington since the onset of the conflict. The country’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has placed trusted lieutenants—largely hard-line figures tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—into key government roles. Figures such as national security adviser Mohsen Rezaei and Hossein Taeb, commander of Iran’s main domestic paramilitary forces, believe that deterring future strikes requires a decisive and aggressive response to any provocation.
They remain deeply skeptical that Washington is genuinely interested in diplomacy, pointing out that the United States has twice attacked Iran during active negotiations and subsequently walked away from the memorandum of understanding signed in June. Consequently, they argue that Washington cannot be trusted and may be using diplomatic overtures merely as cover to plan renewed military strikes.
Iran’s relative moderates hold a somewhat different view. Elites including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, former President Hasan Rouhani, and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have consistently argued that Tehran should continue seeking a diplomatic off-ramp. Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf have publicly highlighted the severe economic hardships facing ordinary citizens. Yet the distance between them and the hard-line leadership is narrower than it appears.
As one regional analyst familiar with these discussions noted, "No one is saying Iran should surrender." While moderates view economic relief as a top priority, their proposed solution is to force the United States to fully implement the June memorandum of understanding. In Tehran’s view, that agreement committed Washington to unfreezing all Iranian assets, lifting all sanctions, halting future attacks, and paying financial reparations in exchange for a simple cease-fire and restored commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, while still allowing Iran to levy transit fees.
Since the end of the summer, Rezaei and Ghalibaf have insisted that any future diplomacy must begin with the United States returning to the terms of that memorandum. These officials believe that Trump is not yet ready for substantive talks and will only return to the negotiating table if he comes to terms with what Tehran views as an Iranian victory—a realization that would require increasing the costs of the war for the United States.
Iran’s regional posture is therefore unconstrained and disproportionate. Should the conflict resume, Tehran is prepared to project power across the wider region rather than just along its immediate borders. The prevailing view within the capital is that prudence and predictability will only invite heavier U.S. pressure without advancing its primary strategic goals: compelling Washington to pull all troops from the Persian Gulf and accepting Iranian primacy.
Repeated Iranian drone and missile attacks on American military assets in Jordan, Syria, and across the Persian Gulf are designed to achieve precisely this objective. To a degree, these tactics have succeeded. The strikes have damaged several key U.S. assets, forcing the American military to shift many operations and resources to Israel and Jordan while relying on a base in the central Indian Ocean for logistical support. The persistent threat has even prompted Washington to withdraw its B-1 bombers from a base in the United Kingdom.
Simultaneously, Tehran is pressuring Washington’s Gulf partners to close foreign military bases on their soil, openly declaring that regional peace depends on the departure of American forces, while targeting states suspected of aiding the U.S. war effort. While Iran is unlikely to completely erase the U.S. military footprint in the Gulf, its actions have made regional governments deeply hesitant to rely exclusively on the American security umbrella.
Even without achieving full economic relief, Iran believes it can coerce Washington into a financial accommodation by driving up global energy costs. To that end, Tehran has targeted energy infrastructure across the Gulf, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas field—hit in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iran’s South Pars field—and oil facilities at the United Arab Emirates’ Fujairah port. Iran has also attacked energy tankers and sought to consolidate control over the Strait of Hormuz, viewing the vital waterway as sovereign territory. Although Washington has fought back to escort tankers through the chokepoint, these naval operations require vast resources that the United States cannot sustain indefinitely.
Iran’s network of regional allies has amplified these pressures. Iraqi militias backed by Tehran have attacked critical oil pipelines carrying Saudi crude to the Red Sea, temporarily curtailing global supplies, while Houthi forces in Yemen have consistently struck Saudi energy sites and advanced toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, threatening a chokepoint through which 12 percent of global trade passes.
STEADY AS SHE GOES
The United States may operate under the assumption that it has successfully cornered Iran, but Tehran sees the situation entirely differently. Rather than viewing itself as defensive or out of options, the Iranian leadership believes it has secured de facto great-power status. Officials in Tehran welcomed the enthusiastic reception their diplomatic delegation received at the September meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS consortium.
While monumental economic and social challenges remain, and Tehran has yet to translate its wartime resilience into permanent peacetime gains, the government is fully prepared to continue the fight if necessary. As one senior Iranian analyst close to policymakers observed, the population remains "willing to endure economic pain and the suffering, if it means that [they] are going to win." With political elites coalescing around a unified strategy, Tehran remains confident that staying the course will bring ultimate success without the need for compromise.
