To many external observers, these might appear to be surprisingly resilient days for the Islamic Republic of Iran. After years of enduring severe diplomatic isolation, economic strangulation, and military pressure, the Iranian regime recently came face-to-face with its ultimate nightmare scenario—a full-blown, direct military conflict with Israel and the United States—and remarkably survived.
The United States launched a sweeping bombing campaign against Iran on February 28, with the stated goals of dismantling the country’s nuclear program, neutralizing its missile inventory, and ultimately toppling the government in Tehran. Yet, by many accounts, the military campaign fell short of its primary objectives. In the wake of the onslaught, Tehran may actually find itself in a position of heightened strategic assertiveness compared to when hostilities began. The regime successfully seized control of the vital Strait of Hormuz, shutting down the critical maritime corridor and sending global energy prices soaring. Furthermore, Iranian armed forces have demonstrated a sustained capacity to damage American military installations despite sustaining heavy bombardment. With domestic U.S. political support for the conflict slipping and international frustration mounting against Washington, many regional analysts now conclude that Tehran is prepared to stay the course through the coming year.
Within the corridors of power, Iranian officials are privately and publicly acknowledging how their nation has weathered the assault. While some public figures have openly declared victory and boasted of their survival, private conversations among the regime’s elites reveal a lingering sense of anxiety. Senior officials remain keenly aware that the United States retains an extensive arsenal of strategic tools and tactical options to escalate pressure further. They worry that current constraints holding Washington back—such as dwindling ammunition stockpiles, domestic political hesitation, and international opposition—could eventually dissipate or become manageable for American decision-makers.
For Washington, this dynamic might initially look like an opportunity. If Tehran retains a baseline fear of American power, policymakers might assume the U.S. government can compel Iran’s leadership into diplomatic concessions. However, regional experts warn that this perspective fundamentally misreads the current mood in the Iranian capital. The country’s ruling elite has been profoundly hardened by a war that claimed the lives of close friends, colleagues, and family members.
For Iran’s leadership, February 28, 2026, carries the same psychological weight that October 7, 2023, holds for Israel: it is viewed as the precise moment an adversary proved willing to attempt their wholesale slaughter, cementing the belief that the enemy must be permanently defeated. Having previously harbored deep skepticism toward American negotiators, Tehran’s leadership now holds virtually no faith in diplomatic channels whatsoever.
Consequently, Iran is charting a strategic course defined by continuous offense and military escalation. Rather than simply maintaining its position or seeking a compromise with Washington, Tehran is signaling that it will take aggressive steps to further damage the economies of U.S. regional partners, decimate global energy markets, and systematically expand attacks on American military infrastructure. Options under consideration or already underway include potential assassination plots targeting American and Israeli officials, as well as more ambitious ground operations against neighboring states, including maneuvers aimed at seizing U.S. bases stationed across Gulf Arab nations.
Even if neither side can achieve total military victory in the near term and both eventually accept a negotiated settlement, regional analysts warn that sustainable peace is unlikely to take root. Tehran operates under the firm conviction that Washington will eventually regroup and renew hostilities. The regime remains deeply committed to responding forcefully to any perceived American provocation, and potentially launching preemptive strikes even in the absence of one. In the view of Iran’s leadership, peaceful coexistence with a permanent U.S. military presence in the Middle East is untenable. Their enduring strategic objective is to make the cost of American regional engagement so prohibitive that Washington is ultimately forced to withdraw the bulk of its troops, concede Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, and formally recognize the Islamic Republic as an unassailable regional power.
Fear and Loathing in Tehran
When the joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran commenced, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was attending a high-level meeting inside Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s sprawling compound. Araghchi had spent the preceding months engaged in delicate negotiations with the United States regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In the weeks leading up to the strikes, however, Washington had steadily repositioned military assets closer to the Persian Gulf, issuing demands that Tehran completely dismantle its nuclear enrichment activities. Amidst public suggestions from U.S. President Donald Trump regarding potential regime change, Araghchi was briefing senior officials on the deteriorating security environment when the initial wave of bombs struck.
The supreme leader’s compound was a primary target in the opening barrage, resulting in the deaths of numerous high-ranking officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. Araghchi, however, survived the blast. Emerging from the rubble dazed and covered in debris, he recounted to an Iranian podcaster that he rushed into the street, flagged down a passing civilian vehicle, and directed the driver to take him to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From there, he attempted to reestablish contact with surviving military commanders and foreign counterparts as other surviving officials slowly gathered to reconstitute the government.
The Islamic Republic had long anticipated the possibility of a decapitation strike targeting Khamenei and his inner circle, leaving the administrative apparatus relatively well-prepared for the immediate aftermath. For nearly a year prior, the government had systematically decentralized its political and military bureaucracies, empowering provincial governors and regional commanders to operate independently without direct orders from the central leadership. Furthermore, senior officials had been mandated to designate at least two potential successors in the event of their deaths.
Despite these contingency measures, the psychological toll on the regime was profound. Leadership could no longer safely inhabit fixed locations, instead spending countless hours shuttling between underground bunkers in cars and on motorcycles while mourning the loss of colleagues, friends, and family members. The country’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, suffered devastating personal losses in the attacks, including his father, wife, sister, and niece. U.S. intelligence officials have also indicated that Mojtaba himself sustained injuries during the bombardments.
These combined shocks predictably hardened the regime’s hostility toward Washington and Jerusalem. Compounding this anger were direct U.S. strikes on critical civilian infrastructure, including domestic energy plants and transportation networks. Concluding that Israel and the United States were waging a total war aimed at eradicating the Iranian state rather than merely targeting its ruling institutions, the regime adopted a significantly more aggressive posture.
Mojtaba Khamenei elevated hawkish military commanders to replace fallen leaders, issuing directives to prepare for comprehensive offensive operations against adversaries. Mohsen Rezaei, who formerly headed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War, was appointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Rezaei publicly declared that Iran would actively target American economic interests and oil companies alongside traditional military installations.
Furthermore, Tehran shifted from relying primarily on regional nonstate proxies to openly striking Washington’s partners directly. In July, for instance, Iran launched a preemptive missile strike against bases in Jordan utilized by the U.S. military, arguing the facilities served as staging grounds for attacks against Iranian territory. The strike resulted in the deaths of three American soldiers.
This newly minted operational approach is designed to systematically erode American military and intelligence architecture across the Middle East. Security analysts note that Iran is effectively developing its own version of Israel’s "mowing the lawn" strategy—executing repeated, measured military operations to degrade an adversary’s capabilities between major conflicts. By doing so, Tehran hopes to diminish the ability of the United States to protect its regional forces and allies, ultimately rendering continued American military presence untenable.
Pressing the Advantage
Iranian leadership has expressed satisfaction with the immediate outcomes of this escalation doctrine. Officials believe that rapid and massive retaliatory actions across the region successfully compelled Israel and the United States to limit the scope of their strikes against Iranian civilian infrastructure, thereby helping to de-escalate the highest-intensity phase of the war.
Nevertheless, Iranian elites do not believe Tehran has secured total victory. For decades, U.S. and Israeli officials have predicted the imminent collapse of the Islamic Republic, and even following its unexpectedly robust military performance, Western leaders continue to characterize the regime as fragile. In September, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent publicly described the country as being "in a death spiral."
To the ruling regime, this perception gap presents a dangerous miscalculation. Iranian officials remain convinced that if Washington believes the government is vulnerable to collapse via sanctions, targeted strikes, or domestic protests, the economic and military pressure will never relent. Prior to his death, the elder Khamenei repeatedly warned both publicly and privately that Washington would not leave Iran alone until its military dominance was undeniable. In August, Mojtaba directed the armed forces to achieve what he termed "maximum deterrence" against the United States.
While past generations of Iranian leaders occasionally entertained the possibility of negotiating peaceful coexistence with Washington, that sentiment has nearly vanished within the current regime. Tehran’s prevailing view is that the United States has proven itself incapable of acting as a good-faith diplomatic partner. Officials point to Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after just three years, as well as the timing of U.S. military strikes in June 2025 and February 2026, both of which occurred while bilateral diplomatic talks were actively underway. Furthermore, Tehran holds the United States responsible for the collapse of their most recent diplomatic framework—a memorandum of understanding signed in June—following American efforts to open a new shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian leadership also harbors deep anxieties that their current tactical advantage may be temporary. Over time, the global economy could successfully adapt by finding alternative export routes that bypass the Persian Gulf entirely, blunting the strategic impact of closing the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Washington’s political calculus could shift. Iranian strategists believe President Trump is currently constrained by domestic political considerations ahead of upcoming midterm elections, during which an expanded war with Iran remains deeply unpopular.
Once those elections conclude, however, the administration may feel unbound by domestic approval metrics. While Tehran could theoretically wait out the current administration in hopes of a Democratic victory in 2028, past experience suggests little relief from that quarter. Officials recall that President Joe Biden campaigned on returning to the 2015 nuclear agreement only to subsequently pursue Trump’s "maximum pressure" campaign once in office. A future moderate administration could potentially pose an even greater strategic threat by successfully repairing frayed international alliances and enlisting Asian, European, and Middle Eastern partners to bolster Washington’s anti-Iran coalition.
Consequently, the regime is unlikely to remain passive. Tehran is actively evaluating mechanisms to increase pressure on Washington, starting with the complete throttling of remaining gas and oil exports from the Persian Gulf. While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has already choked off a vast majority of this trade, certain Gulf states maintain limited export capabilities through direct access to the Indian Ocean or via Red Sea transit routes. To neutralize these pathways, Iran could directly target regional oil production facilities and maritime ports.
Additionally, Tehran could coordinate with Houthi allies in Yemen to shut down Red Sea shipping lanes by threatening commercial vessels, replicating tactics used extensively during the Gaza conflict. With Houthi forces having strengthened their territorial control in Yemen against Saudi-backed factions, the waterway remains highly vulnerable, prompting Riyadh to temporarily suspend operations along its primary East-West oil pipeline.
Tehran is also positioned to intensify direct attacks against its primary antagonists. This could involve increased drone and missile volleys targeting U.S. military installations or expanded cyber operations directed at American civilian infrastructure. U.S. officials previously attributed a July cyberattack that temporarily knocked out parts of Minnesota’s water infrastructure to Iranian state actors. In the event of renewed hostilities, Iranian forces could aggressively target regional civilian utilities, including desalinating plants, to render populated areas uninhabitable.
Furthermore, Tehran appears determined to revive its historical capability for targeted assassinations against American and Israeli personnel. Throughout the 1980s, the Islamic Republic and allied regional groups frequently utilized targeted killings and bombings against dissidents and foreign military personnel abroad before largely phasing out such operations in the late 1990s as conventional missile and drone deterrents were acquired. While Iranian security analysts acknowledge that their military lacks the advanced intelligence apparatus and high-end hardware—such as F-35 fighter jets—possessed by Israel and the United States, covert operations remain a viable alternative. U.S. officials previously reported a foiled Iranian plot to assassinate Donald Trump in 2024, an allegation denied by Tehran. Beyond high-profile targets, the Iranian army announced in August a bounty program offering financial rewards for the elimination or capture of U.S. service members.
No Quarter
If conventional deterrence fails to pacify Israel and the United States, Iranian officials have indicated a willingness to introduce novel asymmetrical tactics. Beyond energy blockades, the Strait of Hormuz houses critical global communications infrastructure, including undersea internet cables linking Europe to South Asia. Tehran possesses the capability to sever these lines using combat divers, uncrewed underwater vehicles, or surface vessels dragging heavy anchors across the seabed.
More dramatically, Iranian analysts have openly discussed the concept of establishing territorial security zones, drawing inspiration from Israeli military maneuvers in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria following the events of October 7. Should Tehran anticipate an imminent American ground invasion—particularly after U.S. officials floated the possibility of occupying Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil export terminal—hardline parliament members and military strategists have proposed preemptively seizing territory in neighboring Bahrain and Kuwait to neutralize forward operating bases. Such actions would likely be framed by Tehran as defensive measures designed to deny adversaries staging grounds.
Similar strategic logic could be applied along northern borders. Longstanding tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran have deteriorated in recent years, fueled by competing territorial claims and Baku’s close security partnership with Israel. Amidst credible accusations from Iranian elites that Azerbaijan permits Israeli intelligence operations from its soil, Tehran could target Azerbaijani energy infrastructure or move to seize Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave situated directly on the Iranian border.
Similar calculations apply to the Kurdish region of Iraq, which Tehran views as a potential staging area for hostile operations. With American officials having previously weighed arming Kurdish opposition groups to mount a ground offensive, a perceived U.S. push to establish a land corridor from Israel through Iraqi Kurdistan could trigger a preemptive Iranian ground incursion. In such a scenario, Tehran could deploy allied Iraqi militias to pressure Syria or counter regional adversaries, while simultaneously calling upon Houthi forces to intensify pressure within Saudi territory.
Finally, Tehran retains the option of pursuing a nuclear weapon—a threshold American and Israeli officials have spent decades attempting to prevent. While the Iranian government continues to maintain official adherence to a civilian nuclear program, an increasing number of domestic elites and parliamentarians openly argue that weaponization is a necessary prerequisite for absolute deterrence. Although taking definitive steps toward a nuclear weapon risks triggering a massive retaliatory escalation from Washington and Jerusalem, Iran’s leadership may ultimately conclude that acquiring a nuclear deterrent is the only definitive method to halt ongoing military attacks.
Appetite for Destruction
Even if Iran refrains from an immediate dash for a nuclear weapon, Israel and the United States could respond to escalating provocations with broader military campaigns. However, short of an extraordinarily costly full-scale ground invasion, it remains unclear what additional strategic objectives Western forces can achieve. The Iranian regime has proven highly adaptable, viewing the conflict as an existential struggle that brooks no alternative to survival. Continued decapitation strikes, infrastructure destruction, or ground incursions are widely assessed to reinforce the regime’s domestic resolve rather than fracture it, pushing Tehran further up the escalation ladder.
Should Washington recognize these limits, future efforts may focus on brokering a cease-fire or freezing the conflict. Yet, over the long term, such diplomatic freezes are unlikely to resolve core tensions. The Islamic Republic has articulated a clear, uncompromising ultimate objective: the complete removal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East. To achieve this, the regime remains prepared to sustain a wartime posture indefinitely, potentially launching synchronized, large-scale offensives against regional bases and naval forces when American defenses appear vulnerable.
Nevertheless, Iranian leadership remains mindful of domestic political vulnerabilities. While the Islamic Republic operates as an authoritarian state, history demonstrates that aggressive foreign adventures can severely destabilize regimes facing internal economic strain. Analysts frequently point to the collapse of Argentina’s military junta following the failed 1982 Falklands War as a cautionary historical parallel.
Aware of these domestic risks, senior Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of maintaining internal and international backing for military decisions. In an August interview, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei stressed that the country’s trajectory would remain calculated and rational, ensuring that the international community understands Iran is not driven by a reckless desire for war.
At the same time, the regime believes that the rhetoric and actions of the Trump administration have paradoxically galvanized domestic unity. Prior to February 28, substantial segments of the Iranian population remained skeptical of official warnings regarding American intentions. However, the subsequent bombing of civilian infrastructure, combined with public claims of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and threats regarding the destruction of Iranian civilization, lent unprecedented credibility to the regime’s narrative.
In many ways, contemporary leadership is drawing directly upon the foundational experiences of the Islamic Republic’s earliest years. Following the 1979 revolution, the nascent state faced a devastating invasion by Iraq and repeated decapitation strikes by internal opposition groups, including a 1981 bombing that decimated the leadership of the governing Islamic Republican Party. The survivors of that era concluded that institutional resilience alone was insufficient; the regime needed to project overwhelming retaliatory strength to deter future challenges.
With current leadership largely drawn from that same revolutionary-era cohort, the lesson remains deeply ingrained. Convinced that the United States is strategically reeling, that international sympathy is growing, and that domestic constituents support their defensive posture, Tehran’s leadership appears prepared to absorb substantial risks. To these officials, the current environment represents a historic window of opportunity—one in which aggressive escalation may finally achieve their long-sought goal of altering the balance of power in the Middle East.
